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Abstract: The following interview took place on June 6, 2018 as part of the interview series 
“The Intellectual and his/her Memory” of the School of Philosophy and Letters of the Univer-
sity of Granada. During the interview, Jay reflected upon his intellectual career, the current 
state of critical theory and dialectical categories, the status of truth in our time, postsecu-
larism and identity politics.
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Abstract: La siguiente entrevista se realizó el 6 de junio de 2018 en el marco del ciclo de 
entrevistas “El intelectual y su memoria” de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universi-
dad de Granada. A lo largo de la entrevista, Jay reflexionó acerca de su carrera intelectual, 
el estado actual de la teoría crítica y de las categorías dialécticas, el estatus de la verdad 
hoy en día, el postsecularismo y las políticas identitarias.
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Martin Jay is Sidney Hellman Ehrman Professor of History Emeritus at the University of 
California, Berkeley. Martin Jay started his career around the pivotal year of 1968, at a time 
when the last fundamental books of the Frankfurt School (Negative Dialectics and Aesthet-
ic Theory) were published and the main works of the soon-to be vanguard of contemporary 
French Thought (Guilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault) were being written. In 
those years, Martin Jay interviewed and studied the first generation of the Frankfurt School, 
which resulted in the publication of his PhD thesis under the title of The Dialectical Imagi-
nation (1973). Subsequently, Jay published a monograph on Theodor W. Adorno (1984), a 
study on the category of totality in Western Marxism (1984) and a seminal study on the cri-
tique of vision in French Thought, Downcast Eyes (1993). In addition to a newly-developed 
interest in American thought, especially pragmatism, Jay’s two main areas of expertise, 
critical theory and post-structuralism, continued to inspire his later works: Songs of Experi-
ence (2004), The Virtues of Mendacity (2010) and Reason after its Eclipse (2016). Martin 
Jay has also published an enormous number of articles in scholarly journals, and has been 
a regular collaborator in Salmagundi since 1987. 
Q – Your work, following your own convictions in relation to intellectual history, has de-
veloped in tension with the social, political and historical realities of the past fifty years. Your 
interviews with T. W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer took place precisely at a time when both 
philosophers were under attack by the leaders of the 1968 revolts. You became involved in 
the study of the French critics of vision in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the time of 
9/11, you were immersed in the analysis of the concept of experience. Your study of lying in 
politics was marked by the 2008 financial crisis. Your own intellectual history can therefore 
be understood against the backdrop of a complex historical context. Why did you decide to 
study the history of the Frankfurt School fifty years ago and how did your interests expand, 
following Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas 
(1984), into post-structuralism and the critique of visuality? To what extent political and his-
torical changes have marked your own intellectual development?
A – The question of how I first became interested in critical theory is often asked and 
the answer that I normally give is two-part. First, in the 1960s’ America I was part of a 
generation that was in a sense both part of the New Left and part of the counter culture. 
In the 1960s, Herbert Marcuse was a figure of great importance but also of great mystery. 
We had no real sense of where he came from. Books like Eros and Civilization (1955) and 
One-Dimensional Man (1964) had an impact allowing us to think of ourselves as perhaps 
as oppressed as the working class had been in an earlier Marxist version of social conflict or 
as minorities, especially African-Americans, were in the United States. H. Marcuse allowed 
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us to think, as allegedly privileged mainstream white male Americans, that we too were 
somehow oppressed by capitalism, that we too were victims of one-dimensionality, that 
we too were victims of the culture industry. In a way, that gave us permission to be radical. 
H. Marcuse’s theories could be used as a self-justification for the radicalism of the New Left, 
and although I cannot pretend to have been a full-fledged member of any militant New Left 
position, I nonetheless was a sympathizer. H. Marcuse gave us that kind of permission but 
we had no idea where he came from. There was no real sense of even Hegelian Marxism, 
let alone something called the Frankfurt School. There was that mystery to be solved and 
I was fascinated by trying to figure out H.Marcuse’s own background. During that period 
a book called The Unknown Dimension (1972) was published and I had a piece in it, ulti-
mately out of my dissertation. It was edited by Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare and it dealt 
not only with the Frankfurt School but with other schools of thought that came to be called 
“Western Marxism”. Figures like Karl Korsch and George Lukács, Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Louis Althusser and others were included in this book, and as the 
title suggested, in the 1960s and early 1970s all this was unknown. We were discovering as 
it were a new continent of thought, usually through translations, since our command of lan-
guages was rather weak. I was part of this very exciting moment of discovery, the discovery 
of a Western Marxist tradition which I later tried to understand in its complexity in Marxism 
and Totality moving beyond the Frankfurt School. 
The second source of my interest was a growing sense that the so-called “intellectual 
migration”, people who had come from Germany in the 1930s-1940s and after the Holo-
caust, this generation which had so enriched American intellectual life, was now passing 
from the scene. Some had died, many were retired, they were at the point of their careers 
where they were interested in telling their stories. My dissertation director at Harvard was 
a man named Henry Stuart Hughes who had worked with a number of these people in the 
OSS (Office of Strategic Services). He knew H. Marcuse, he knew Franz Neumann, he had 
been part of the American war effort and he was very interested in the migration himself. 
In fact he was to write a book about the intellectual migration a few years later (The Sea 
Change, 1975) in the trilogy that began with Consciousness and Society (1958). I was 
fascinated by that group of people, many of whom were living, and I wrote later about a 
number of the others: Hannah Arendt, Henry Pachter, and Siegfried Kracauer, who had 
already died. It was in that larger context of the migration of these figures that I began to be 
interested in the Frankfurt School. 
But there was a third reason and I would have to admit that it is very personal: My 
background is basically assimilated Jewish, non-observant religiously but identifying very 
clearly with that tradition. And many of the people from the migration and most of the 
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members of the Frankfurt school also came from Jewish backgrounds more or less lacking 
a strong religious dimension. It was a certain identification with these people, and it was 
an identification which involved a kind of “upward cultural mobility”. As an American there 
was something about European high culture, European Bildung, as the Germans call it, 
which was extraordinarily attractive. It was a kind of ideal version of the way in which a 
truly cultured figure might be and I think a lot of Americans felt in a way that they aspire 
to achieve that. So to take the intellectual migration seriously, to take the Frankfurt school 
seriously meant in a way identifying with that level of high European culture. But and this is 
the fascinating thing about the Frankfurt School in particular instead of seeing it as elitist, 
as discriminatory, as conservative, as somehow bound to the status quo, they had turned 
it in a critical and even subversive direction. They had been interested in high art, yes, but 
also in the avant-garde. They had been interested in reading German idealism but reading it 
against the grain. They were interested in figures like Friedrich Nietzsche I wrote my under-
graduate senior thesis on F. Nietzsche who were also transgressive figures. It allowed you 
and this is a kind of confessional moment to identify with high culture, to aspire to be a to be 
a gebildeter Mensch, to be somehow part of that great tradition of European high culture 
and yet also be critical, subversive, to understand the political implications of all this, to read 
it against the grain and develop a kind of appreciation of the dialectical if we could use that 
term ways in which the high and the low of the seemingly elite and the democratic could 
be intertwined. In a way, the intellectual history tradition that I assumed as a student was a 
tradition which gave us access to ideas which had that subversive potential but were not 
necessarily part of the cutting-edge of fields in the present. For example, psychoanalysts. 
Most members of the Frankfurt School were very interested in Sigmund Freud, and many 
of the migrants were practicing psychoanalysts, but in psychology departments psychoa-
nalysis was dead. Psychoanalysis was surpassed and other types of behavioral psychology 
or a variety of different kinds of analysis—therapeutic or otherwise—dominated. To be inter-
ested in a figure like S. Freud was to be interested in someone who had the potential to be 
interesting at a time when he was no longer taken very seriously. And the same of course 
happens with Marx, who for a long time was marginalized and even a condemned figure. 
It was possible to act as an intellectual storehouse, as a kind of placeholder or repository 
for ideas which were once important but were no longer important and might one day be 
important again. Intellectual history was looking towards the past but also looking towards 
the future.
I could go on and go through each work and see it as related to specific larger trends 
in American and world history, but I am not sure I could tie them quite as easily. Marxism 
and Totality was begun when Western Marxism was still riding high, but by the time it was 
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published in 1984 that wave had crested. The book ends with a very brief discussion of 
something new on the horizon which was, broadly speaking, French post-structuralism, 
which had a great impact in American academia. I took very seriously figures like M. Fou-
cault, Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Deleuze and others who were emerging as alter-
natives to German thought. What made them particularly exciting for me was the idea that 
they were not simply the opponents of these German traditions that I had understood, but 
they could be better used as a kind of enrichment of them: It was possible to ask difficult 
questions that they illuminated for the first time. For example, T. W. Adorno’s various no-
tions of non-identity and negative dialectics could in complicated ways be compared with 
J. Derrida. Their understanding of psychoanalysis could be compared with J. Lacan’s read-
ing of psychoanalysis. M. Foucault and Jürgen Habermas had a kind of complicated re-
lationship in the question of power and knowledge, and not always one that was fully 
compatible. There was a healthy, but not completely successful, exchange between the 
German tradition and French post-structuralism. 
The Virtues of Mendacity had been stimulated not by George W. Bush, who had 
been accused often of having lied about the weapons of mass destruction that sup-
posedly were in Iraq, but rather by a book about Bill Clinton’s presidency by Christo-
pher Hitchens called No One Left To Lie To (1999), which attacked Clinton for being 
mendacious. What this showed me was that Clinton, Bush, and other figures of political 
importance were all on some level open to the accusation that they were hypocritical 
or outright liars. This suggested that there was an affinity or at least a complicated rela-
tionship between political discourse, political action, leadership in politics and a certain 
bending of the truth or creating a kind of smokescreen in which the truth was not fully 
told. In the age of Trump we have now achieved a kind of hyperlevel of this, and my 
book, which in a somewhat perverse way defended a level of lying in politics—I could 
go into the reasons why I made that defense , now seems like a bad omen of what 
was to come. The way I now conceptualize the link between the two moments—when 
Clinton or Bush or other figures in politics were in some ways using a kind of hypocri-
sy politically and what we now see with Trump , is the idea of the pharmakon, an old 
Greek idea which was revived by Derrida. The pharmakon has to do with the dosage: A 
small dose of a medicine may cure you, but a large dose may be a poison. In the case 
of lying in politics, I would argue that a lot of little lies or little spins creating a rhetorical 
smokescreen that obscures the absolute truth can have a healthy effect, but if the dose 
is too large and this is what we are now being subjected to with the current American 
administration the effects are indeed poisonous.
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Q – In 1996, you wrote a foreword to a new edition of The Dialectical Imagination 
which still is one of the main sources on the history of the Frankfurt School today. In this 
foreword, you argued that the relevance of the Frankfurt School after 1973 could be ex-
plained by a certain tendency to neglect economical criticism and a growing interest in aes-
thetic and cultural questions. Is this same diagnosis valid after the financial crisis of 2008 or 
maybe economic questions are now more important than ever, as the renewed interest in 
the criticism of political economy and Marxism suggest? In other words, are the ideas of T. 
W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer or J. Habermas and Axel Honneth still useful today or have 
they now been surpassed?
A – Broadly speaking, the history of Marxism has been a series of shifts of empha-
sis of terrain. The first period, at least the one that occurs after the failures of the 1848 
Revolution, is a period that emphasizes the economy and the crisis which, according to 
Marx, flow from capitalism’s inability to solve economically-derived problems. This led in 
the Second International to a kind of waiting for capitalism to collapse of its own weight, 
which of course did not happen. The second period begins, we might say, in 1917 and 
we might call that the “period of political emphasis” (“political” in a Leninist sense or at 
least in a more activist sense one could think of Antonio Gramsci’s notion of Marxism as 
a “philosophy of praxis”). This was a period in which it seemed that one had to organ-
ize politically, one had to be somehow involved in overthrowing political systems and 
then economic change would follow. This period more or less ends with the success of 
fascism and the failure of the world revolution to follow from the Russian example. This 
introduces a period of what J. Habermas called a “strategy of hibernation” (142) in which 
the belief that the economy would produce a terminal crisis was no longer possible be-
cause capitalism had stabilized. The belief that politics could produce a revolution also 
stalled after the failure of the attempt to stop fascism, and instead the terrain shifted from 
economics to politics, to culture, to art, to the everyday life, that under capitalism was 
still problematic, still oppressive in fact, but which might produce a different conscious-
ness if a certain kind of critique could be absorbed by its victims. The Frankfurt School 
appeared in this third period, but behind this there was still the capitalist economy, the 
commodity fetishes of the exchange principle and the potential for crisis, the potential for 
the system not to work. There are examples 2008 is the most recent in which there is a 
hint that maybe capitalism is not so stable after all, maybe there is a way in which it has 
its own internal, self-destructive impulses. We know from Thomas Piketty and his work 
on the stubborn persistence of inequality that the world system as a whole has a terrible 
potential to increase class distinctions and to give more power to the wealthy and less to 
those who lack economic resources. The crisis of 2008 was however solved or at least 
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postponed, and once again capitalism found a way to restabilize. The state had to help 
it in certain respects, but we came very close to the precipice. One might argue that the 
so-called economic deficit of critical theory, which means that it needs to come up with a 
more explicit theory of modern twenty-first-century capitalism, is still an important imper-
ative. We need to include the economy but I would say it is wrong to think that the cultural 
analysis, the analyses of psychology and mass culture (or rather the culture industry) are 
now simply swept aside and that we can go back to something like that first period in 
which the economy was really determinant. We have a period of what J. Habermas calls a 
“new unsurveyability”, a “neue Unübersichtlichkeit” in which you cannot really survey the 
whole. Global capitalism exists, yes, but so do issues like multiculturalism, the anti-mi-
grant prejudice and all those things which are not simply reducible to the issues of capi-
talist crises. I think that rather than saying that J. Habermas or even T. W. Adorno and M. 
Horkheimer have been surpassed one should think of the ways to supplement their work 
by once again thinking about politics and once again thinking about the economy and 
its difficulties, but not arguing that one must replace the other. The larger task of critical 
theory is to figure out how they are related. I am an historian and I could use that as an 
excuse to say that I don’t have the answer to how they are related, and I would not pre-
tend to have a serious critique of contemporary capitalism. I am also not clear, politically, 
about what is to be done, in a literal sense, but I think it is necessary to still draw on and 
build on the legacy of the critique of culture that the Frankfurt School itself fell back on 
when both economics and politics no longer seemed the center of gravity of the critique 
of contemporary society.
Q – Following on from the previous question, I would also like to ask about the pos-
sibility of recovering dialectical categories such as negativity or immanent criticism in our 
socio-political context. In an interview in 2016 with Jamie Keesling and Spencer A. Leonard 
entitled “Critical Theory, Marxism, Social Evolution”, you warned of the dangers of a con-
ceptualization of negativity “without rational critique, without plausible goals and laudable 
values”. Certainly, the complexity of the current political moment is undeniable. What diag-
nosis are you able to offer in the face of the increase of reactionary forces at a global level 
which seem to be preparing a pretty obvious “moment of danger” in the sense in which 
Benjamin used the expression? How can this moment be approached theoretically with the 
intention of transforming society? Is the programme of a negative dialectics still viable for 
you now that the worst omens of the Frankfurt School about the absolute absence of neg-
ative forces seem to be more fulfilled than ever? If, as you put it, the critique of ideology can 
exist only “when yearnings [for something better] are still accounted better”, are we living in 
an age where those aspirations remain?
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A – One of H. Marcuse’s most powerful slogans in One-Dimensional Man was “the 
great refusal”, the idea and this goes back to my description of a privileged mainstream, 
often male Americans who discovered that they were somehow oppressed that we should 
learn not to be complicitous with the system, not to accept its pseudo-rewards, not to be 
bought off by consumer happiness, but rather to leave the system behind, refuse it at the 
deepest level, refuse to be involved with electoral politics, even refuse to accept gradualism, 
become as radically opposed as you possibly could to the one-dimensionality of the world. 
This was the “great refusal” which allowed you to be unpolluted or uncorrupted by the 
temptations of accommodation. I must admit I always found this histrionic and unpersua-
sive. There was too much that I felt was worth preserving in liberal democratic traditions, the 
welfare state and other traditions which were not simply ideological covers for the power 
relations that kept capitalism and oppression in existence. There was also a defensive qual-
ity rather than one that involved refusal, and the necessity also to have a positive series of 
attainable goals. H. Marcuse’s ultimate goal was explicitly utopian. The “great refusal” went 
along with an intransigence about the possibility of a completely other society, a completely 
utopian society, which he described to some extent in sexual and hedonistic terms in works 
like Eros and Civilization. Here too I must admit that I was always a bit skeptical. The ab-
solute utopia always seemed to me a recipe for either something that was even worse than 
the status quo or simply a disappointment: One cannot really achieve that level of perfection 
without either violence or coercion. Negativity needs to be mixed with a certain practical 
effort to defend what is worth defending and improving a society which will never be abso-
lutely perfect. In the present world, broadly speaking, it seems to me that there is in fact lots 
of negativity, but it is not necessarily emancipatory or enlightenment-oriented negativity. It is 
negativity about many of those things that need to be defended, such as liberal democratic 
traditions. When in Hungary Viktor Orbán talks about “illiberal democracy”, it seems to me 
he is being very negative about traditions of human rights or the rule of law which I hold 
still very dear. I am not in favor of a kind of diffuse, abstract negativity without substance, 
without positive content, and it seems to me that it is therefore necessary to know what 
needs to be defended, to be critical or negative in a traditional sense when you are op-
posing something which is oppressive, but not to turn negativity into an absolute principle 
which should be followed under all circumstances. It is very important, especially as the 
world now seems to be heading in directions that are frightening in many respects, not to 
believe that we are faced with an apocalypse, and that the only way to move beyond it is to 
go through the apocalypse, through a kind of cleansing violence which will allow something 
better to emerge. This seems to be extremely hazardous and has never really worked in the 
past. There are too many victims in the present to allow us to have that kind of apocalyptic 
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mentality, so I think one needs to use negativity as a weapon not only to prevent a simple, 
one-dimensional acceptance of the status quo, but also to identify what traditions need to 
be defended as well as those that need to be rejected.
Q - I would like to ask you about post-truth, a subject on which you have written 
at length in The Virtues of Mendacity, but I would prefer to adopt a visual perspective. 
In “Visual Parrhesia? Foucault and the Truth of the Gaze” (2008), do you criticise the 
impossibility of finding continuity between the risk of “truth-telling” (fearless speech) 
and its relation with modern visuality? If we transpose the traits of the gaze as a way of 
“revealing all” and parrhesia as the verbal technique of “telling all”, both would share 
the attempt to see what, being in the same present, has not been seen. What could the 
Foucauldian concept of parrhesia contribute to this issue? I understand Foucauldian 
parrhesia as the heir of certain traits of a gaze that, beyond the visual regime, allows 
us to address “the opening to the unintended”, which in Downcast Eyes you called “an 
art of trying to see what is unthought in our seeing, and to open as yet unseen ways of 
seeing” (414).
A - This is an enormously complicated question. Maybe there are three different 
ways to look at it. First is the issue of the relation between truth and truthfulness: Truth 
is and this of course is very hard to pin down a description of what is the case: Truth as 
somehow external to the observer, as something that can be found by various methods 
that can be agreed upon by various kinds of differential reasoning and persuasiveness, 
truth as something which involves the world. Truthfulness is a virtue of the individual, of 
the subject. I am truthful when I say something rather than a lie. I am sincere but this 
points to my own intentions. The two may be related, but they are not the same. So if 
for example in the tenth century someone were to ask a citizen of Granada whether or 
not the Sun went around the Earth, the citizen of Granada, not having had the oppor-
tunity to hear what Galileo or Copernicus were to tell the world many years later, would 
have said truthfully that the Sun went around the Earth, but this was not the truth. One 
can separate the two. It seems to me that the parrhesia argument of M. Foucault has 
to do with the subjective truth-teller. It is an issue of character, it is an ethical issue. To 
tell the truth rather than to lie is basically something that we owe other people. Now, 
the difficult question of course is “do we always owe them the truth?” In The Virtues of 
Mendacity I argue not always. For example, in the movie Inglorious Basterds, when 
the Nazi Jew hunter comes to the village where a peasant is hiding Jews during the 
Second World War, initially the peasant lies and says “no one’s here”. Threatened by 
the Jew hunter, he finally tells the truth, which then leads to the murder of all the people 
under his floorboards. So sometimes one has to lie to power, one has to be menda-
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cious: Truth-telling is not under all circumstances a virtue. Truth and truthfulness are 
related but not the same. There is a quite wonderful book by the late Bernard Williams, 
my former colleague at Berkeley, Truth and Truthfulness (2002), that deals with this in 
very complicated ways. 
A second dimension of the issue is the relationship between truth-telling and 
truth-showing. To tell (verbal action) involves an intentionality and then a verbal utterance: I 
know something and I either tell you what I know to be the truth or I tell a lie. There is a kind 
of active internal knowledge and external speech act which has an intended consequence. 
Showing can be very different in the sense that when I take a photograph, the photograph 
simply is, it does not have a kind of intentionality in it. The photographer may in fact try to 
manipulate and alter the fact, he may doctor the photograph but the object itself is mute. 
It does not really quite have the capacity to lie. I did a piece recently (“Can Photographs 
Lie? Reflections on a Perennial Anxiety”, 2016) where I argued that photographs, ultimately 
because they are intertwined with speech and writing, may have a kind of potential to lie, 
but by and large the image is mute. 
A more interesting question has to do with what we might call the ambivalence of full 
transparency, full disclosure, full enlightenment. Those of us who accept a certain notion 
of a transparent political realm and also transparent personal relations, where we have 
relations with people and we try to be as honest as possible, have a kind of bias towards 
the virtue of transparency, the virtue of illumination, the virtue of somehow not hiding and 
not being secretive, not being hypocritical and so forth. This is one of those things that at 
a social level gives us a belief that democracy is inherently transparent, accountable, and 
that it gives people the capacity of knowing what their government is doing, etc. There is 
however also a danger in what might be called “excessive transparency”, as pointed out 
by a recent book by the American scholar Stefanos Geroulanos on the critique of transpar-
ency as a value in French thought (Transparency in Postwar France. A Critical History of 
the Present, 2017), which overlaps in many ways with my book Downcast Eyes. Why is 
transparency a problem and why can secrecy or opacity under certain circumstances be a 
virtue? Well, take for instance the secret ballot, which emerged in the nineteenth century in 
Australia and some states in the United States, and then becomes pretty much the norm 
around the world. When I go into vote I do it in a closed environment, no one knows who I 
vote for, when I come out I do not have to tell you who I vote for, I have privacy. I have the 
right of privacy, the right of not being transparent, the right that the government does not 
know everything about me (in a totalitarian system it tries to but in a democratic system it 
does not know everything about me). We are now of course facing with the Internet and 
the ways in which it is able to track all of our preferences for commercial and political pur-
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poses. There has to be a certain balance between transparency when it is warranted and 
opacity, secrecy, the right to privacy when it is not. This occurs in visual terms as well as in 
terms that we might call “discursive”. So do I have a right always to take a picture of you or 
can you say no I do not want to have my picture taken? We can see this with pictures that 
are obviously private, for example in sexting, of sex pictures of people not wearing clothes. 
Should these be available for everybody to see? There are lots of other examples of the 
way in which we need to keep up a certain façade, our houses are not places that can be 
invaded by the state without a warrant, without a reason. The eye that pierces, the eye that 
intrudes, the eye that sees all like George Orwell’s Big Brother, is also a very dangerous 
eye. The question once again is to whom is the truth owed, to whom is visual transparency 
owed. It is not owed to everybody, it is not owed necessarily to the state, it is not owed to 
commercial interests, and therefore there is a very delicate balance or dialectic between 
the pressure to have full disclosure the idea that sunlight is the best disinfectant on the one 
hand and the idea that I have the right not to be visible, that I have the right not to be ex-
posed, not to be surveilled or seen by the state on the other hand. To complicate matters 
even further, I would like to add the following footnote. The computer engineer Steven Mann 
came up with the term “sousveillance” as opposed to surveillance. Surveillance means 
being looked at from above, whereas “sousveillance” means being looked at from below. 
We have many examples of the latter in the United States and elsewhere: Video allowing 
people who are brutalized by the police to show that brutalization, to show that the police 
may in fact lie when they tell us why they beat up somebody or even kill somebody. It is 
possible to use transparency in this sense in a liberating way to expose the abuse of power 
on the part of authority which otherwise would go unnoticed. What I want to leave you with 
here is not a simple answer but a sense of the contextual need to understand truth-telling 
under certain circumstances, truth-showing under certain circumstances but also its limits 
for political and other reasons.
Q – I would like to have a closer look at the postsecular approaches that, from Taylor 
onwards, have come to revise what our supposedly secular society has ultimately never 
achieved. Recently, we had an example of this in Spain, when the newly-elected Prime 
Minister dispensed with the tradition of taking the oath of office on a Bible and a Crucifix 
for the first time. It appears that the return of religions even posits the prerequisite of un-
derstanding Western religious traditions in order to understand other religious traditions 
such as Islam as well as all kinds of fundamentalisms. It seems to me that your magnificent 
Songs of Experience, published in 2004, tries to answer the question of how to under-
stand religious experience in a context that is nevertheless secular. Thus, your definition of 
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experience deals with a crucible of complex subjects. For instance, you explore the issue of 
intersubjective subjectivity when you define experience as the tension between a collective 
linguistic concept and a private subjectivity as a signifier that unifies a type of heteroge-
neous signifiers located in a diacritical force field, reminding us that such concepts elude 
homogenizing control. First, how do you understand the term “postsecular”? Do you find 
a possible effect of it in your work? And, second, do you think that it is through experience 
as event of the other that we can respond to the social and political challenges posed by 
fundamentalisms?
A – This is an immense question. First of all we have to understand that secularism 
does not mean atheism, and that religion has always survived attempts to eradicate it in the 
Soviet Union or other contexts in which strong atheism was a state policy. Religion always 
survives. It fulfills so many different functions and means so much to different people that it 
is clear it is doing something that surely a rational or scientific approach to the world does 
not do. So what does secularization really mean? It does not mean atheism, but rather a 
relative diminution of the power of religion to permeate all aspects of our lives. As far as I 
would suggest a shorthand definition of it, postsecularism means a willingness to accept 
pluralism, religious pluralism in a context in which no particular religion has established 
authority and becomes hegemonic over others. It realizes that in the modern world there is 
a willingness to tolerate or even to celebrate religious diversity as well as non-religious ex-
istence, so that one can be non-observant or even an atheist and not pay a penalty. There 
has of course always been a pressure against this, a pressure to say that a certain religion 
is dominant. Whether it be Catholicism or Protestantism, Islam, Judaism or Hinduism, there 
has always been a pressure to say that one of them is the true religion and that the others 
are false. This is what has now become a greater threat to the secularization of religion 
understood as a private affair, something that may have been communal but was not co-
ercive. What we have seen in the past decades is the reassertion on the part of some be-
lievers we can call them fundamentalist although they would not accept that term to claim 
that their position is the only true position. Just to use the American example, Evangelical 
Christians under certain circumstances call for a re-description of the United States as a 
Christian nation, which means getting rid of other groups or at least marginalizing them, 
making them somehow understand they are not as welcome. There is in the United States 
now an enormous outcry against the hypocrisy of these Evangelical groups who are able 
to support Donald Trump, who after all is the embodiment of the Antichrist in virtually every 
aspect of his existence. So one wonders whether or not it becomes a kind of cover not for 
real religious belief but for other more political positions on such issues as abortion and so 
forth. The issue of hypocrisy comes to the fore here. 
250THEORY NOW: Journal of literature, critique and thought
Vol 2 Nº 1 Enero-Junio 2019
ISSN 2605-2822
azucena g. blanco y miguel alirangues: an interview with martin jay: an intellectual picture
My own feeling is that religious practices are one way of meeting deep anthropological 
cultural needs for meaning, for some sort of order, for ritual, for community, which can be 
satisfied in other ways but which sometimes are successfully satisfied by religious adher-
ence. So, that is not a question of one being true and the other false, one being early the 
other late, one being superseded, but rather a question of a wide variety of different prac-
tices which give human beings some orientation in a world which is by and large a world 
of danger and of chaos and here I follow Hans Blumenberg, who claims that basically we 
live in a precarious situation in which we do not have an inherent understanding of either 
why we are here, why we are mortal, why human violence exists, why all the dangers of 
the world threaten us and we come up with a variety of different short-term explanations 
which give us some reassurance. They exist for a while and they fail because they are not 
fully satisfactory and others come to replace them. For a significant period of human his-
tory, ever since maybe the Axial Age, the period when the great religions emerged, religion 
played that role. Now, after broadly speaking modernization, the Enlightenment, seculariza-
tion, or whatever you might want to call it, religions lost a bit of their capacity to do that for 
many people, and they still of course do not do it for many, but they were never completely 
obliterated and they have come back. I think we are not living in an age that is postsecular, 
because we were never fully secular in the first place. 
I think it is necessary to be understanding of people’s religion. There is nothing worse 
than assuming that somehow the anti-religious position has some sort of absolute truth 
and we could simply sweep away religion as superstition. It is it seems to me absolutely 
crucial to restore respect for religious difference and plurality: Any society that tries to insti-
tutionalize any one religion is one that is headed for disaster. The United States is alas, at 
least in some respects, moving in that direction, especially because of its panic about Islam, 
new forms of anti-Semitism and a variety of other kinds of religious intolerance which have 
emerged in recent years. Against the philosopher Charles Taylor I would say that a resto-
ration of religion in this sense is deeply problematic and that we should hold on to some of 
the lessons that we learned during the secular age: Lessons of toleration, lessons of the 
private-sphere religion as opposed to a state-oriented or public-sphere religion which tends 
to be biased against other religions and sometimes even leads to violence against them. 
This is an enormously complicated question and I would have to spend a great deal of 
time trying to sort it all out, but I would like to add one little footnote. The Frankfurt School 
always took seriously the emancipatory potential in religion. T. W. Adorno, at the end of 
Minima Moralia (1951) says that the world has to be looked at from “the standpoint of re-
demption” (cliii). M. Horkheimer, in the preface he did to my first book said that we have to 
hold on to the goal of “ein ganz Anderes” (xxvi), “the entirely other”, the completely different, 
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maybe utopian alternative to the current fallen world (“Das ganz Andere” was a term that 
had been coined by Rudolf Otto, a German theologian in the early twentieth century). There 
is always been what I would call a theological or even religious underpinning to their theory. 
That is one of the ways in which the utopian impulse has been expressed.
Q – You concluded Songs of Experience with a reflection on identity politics in which 
you suggested that there had been a certain neglect of the fact that experience is an en-
counter with otherness. And yet, today we seem to be witnessing a process whereby some 
groups within minorities and oppressed groups have done precisely the opposite. In their 
rejection of what is conceptualized as privilege these groups are usually identifying them-
selves with a kind of essential otherness which produces a different kind of the “fortress of 
sameness” on which you wrote in the same book, maybe as a defensive move against the 
growth of reactionary forces we just talked about. It seems that some groups are starting to 
forget that the theses on strategic essentialism advocated by Gayatri Spivak were primarily 
strategic and not primarily essentialist. In this respect, I am particularly concerned about 
the effective boycott of dialogue and the reproduction of a depoliticizing identity atomiza-
tion. What is your opinion on this issue, and how is this problem experienced in the United 
States?
A – This is one of the most controversial and vexed issues in American culture and pol-
itics today. I think one has to give a concrete answer depending on which groups create a 
strong sense of a fortress identity and which groups are more fluid, open and in some ways 
less possessive. It takes a certain amount of security and privilege to feel unthreatened by 
the erosion of your communal identity. I mentioned earlier that I was fascinated by Euro-
pean thought and was interested in German Jewish refugees. I saw this interest as a way 
to achieve a certain idealization through identification with they work, and I think this was 
possible because I did not feel anxious about my own initial communal identity. I did not feel 
threatened, I did not feel as if I would lose something by expanding myself and I have been 
really lucky in my life to have experiences with many different cultures. I spent a summer 
living and teaching in a black community in South Carolina in 1967. I have spent time with 
Mexican theater people going to various cities in Mexico. I have spent time living in a house 
with Indian friends in New Delhi. These have always been enormously enriching and excit-
ing openings to otherness without the anxiety that I was somehow losing my own identity.
There are however groups that have been subjected to a kind of forced assimilation in 
which their identity has been devalued, in which they are seen basically as on some cultural 
or even racial level inferior. In the United States today, certain groups and I think here of Afri-
can Americans, sometimes Hispanic Americans are anxious about the appropriation of their 
culture, anxious about losing their identity. We had a case recently where a white woman 
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claimed that she was black and the black community was very hostile to this woman for 
having somehow appropriated their identity. The idea of cultural appropriation, for instance, 
where whites take black music and make rock and roll, is also seen as aggressive. From 
the perspective of openness and encounter with otherness one could say that this is pet-
ty and perhaps something that needs to be condemned, but one can understand it from 
the perspective of the group whose identity had been so long demeaned. The pride and 
a sense of trying to be recognized in a way that creates solidarity can be understandable. 
Interestingly, the same thing has occurred with the gay community in the United States. 
Michael Warner, one of the most important queer theorists in the United States, became a 
controversial figure as one of the main critics of same-sex marriage from a gay perspective. 
His logic was that same-sex marriage is a process of assimilation which creates, through 
a heteronormative notion of marriage, an erosion of what made gay culture unique, what 
made a kind of outlaw gay culture somehow different from mainstream culture. He wanted 
to protect that difference, to protect the identity which for a long time had been as I said 
in the case of African Americans a demeaned identity, an identity that was stigmatized. He 
wanted to keep it but turn it around and make it itself more attractive while avoiding full 
assimilation. One can see a certain kind of logic in that. Another example has to do with 
the disabled. In the United States there is a great deal of interest now in considering people 
who are often seen as inferior because they cannot hear as well or cannot walk as well or 
whatever disability they might have as equal, not inferior to people who have normal abili-
ties. There are institutions, like Gallaudet University for example, which want to make deaf 
signing a language of its own and not try to allow deaf people to be given medical treatment 
to be able to hear, but instead keep the solidarity and autonomy of people who are deaf. 
Disability studies is a way to say “well, alright, I seem to be less of a human being than you, 
but in fact I am just differently abled. Maybe I am blind, but I could do other things better 
than you, such as hearing”. Even blindness has a certain potential virtue. A colleague of 
mine, Georgina Kleege, has written very movingly about this topic. 
I would say the issue of identity and experience, the issue of fortress identity, the issue 
of deciding that you are somehow going to hold on and keep the other at bay is a contex-
tual, situational and relational issue depending on which group at which time we are talking 
about. I do not want to give a kind of blanket condemnation of identity politics or say that 
identity politics is always in and of itself valuable. In the United States now we are seeing 
a movement which could be called “white identity politics”, in which people who were in 
some ways privileged in many respects now feel threatened and say “well, wait a minute, 
there is black studies, why isn’t there white studies? Well, if there is affirmative action for 
blacks, why is not there affirmative action for, say, poor and disadvantaged whites?” There 
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is now a kind of adoption of the same rhetoric that minority groups used for beleaguered 
whites, and much of the support for nativist populism that we see in the base of Donald 
Trump comes from the sense of grievance and resentment on the part of whites who claim 
that their culture has been attacked and undermined. One has to be very careful about as-
suming all identity politics is inherently valuable or necessarily problematic.
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